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Notes
California’s New Law Will Fail to Address the
Larger Problem of Brady Violations
CHRISTINA E. URHAUSEN*
Brady violations have become a growing epidemic in California. As a result,
California recently enacted a new law that amends section 141 of the Penal Code.
The law changes the status of an “intentional” Brady violation from a misdemeanor
to a felony, and imposes up to three years of prison time for those found guilty. This
Note argues that this new law will fail to address the systematic problem of Brady
violations. Part I discusses the legal history of the Brady decision and its progeny,
as well as the shortcomings of the Brady rule. Part II explores the pervasiveness of
Brady violations in California specifically. Part III explains why current safeguards
are insufficient to control the problem. Part IV argues that California’s new law will
have little to no effect in reducing the number of Brady violations in California.
Finally, Part V proposes alternative reforms that would address the fundamental
problems that lead to Brady violations.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1986, Mark Sodersten was found guilty of the rape and murder1
of a twenty-six-year-old woman. However, the prosecution had virtually
no direct physical evidence linking Sodersten to the crime.2 Instead, the
prosecution heavily relied on the testimony of two eyewitnesses: Nicole
Wilson, the victim’s three-year-old daughter, and Lester Williams, the
victim’s neighbor.3 Two decades later, in the midst of Sodersten’s habeas
corpus proceedings, it was discovered that the prosecutor never disclosed
four audiotapes of statements made by the two key witnesses, which were
inconsistent with their trial testimony.4 For example, one of the tapes

1. In re Sodersten, 53 Cal. Rtpr. 3d 572, 576 (Ct. App. 2007).
2. Id. at 619.
3. Mark Curriden, Harmless Error? A New Study Claims Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Rampant
in California, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2010, at 18–19.
4. Id. at 18.
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revealed that witness Lester Williams stated he did not remember the
night of the murder because he was high on drugs.5
The Court of Appeal ruled that the tapes could have provided the
defense with devastating impeachment evidence that likely would have
resulted in a different verdict.6 “This case,” the court declared, “raises the
one issue that is the most feared aspect of our systemthat an innocent
man might be convicted.”7 Unfortunately, Sodersten died six months
prior to the ruling awarding him a new trial. He spent twenty-two years
in prison, all the while maintaining his innocence.8 Equally as troubling,
the trial prosecutor never faced any consequences for neglecting to turn
over the evidence, despite the fact that two of the recorded interviews
were conducted by the prosecutor himself.9
Mark Sodersten’s case is an example of what can happen when
prosecutors fail to comply with their constitutional obligation to disclose
exculpatory evidence to the defense, also known as a Brady violation.10
The Supreme Court’s decision in Brady v. Maryland was intended “to
level the playing field between prosecutors and criminal defendants.”11
However, as exemplified by Mark Sodersten’s case, it has not always been
effective. California in particular has seen a growing epidemic of Brady
violations.12 It is a significant problem because it seriously undermines
the fairness of criminal trials and can lead to wrongful convictions.13
While many prosecutors are honest and ethical, the reality remains
that far too many Brady violations have occurred in California.14 The
structure of the prosecutorial system itself invites these Brady violations.
Prosecutors hold an enormous amount of power in the criminal justice
system, and they are given vast discretion in prosecuting cases.15 At the
same time, prosecutors are among the least accountable legal actors
because the system currently lacks effective mechanisms to address

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Sodersten, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 622.
Id. at 617, 619.
Id. at 625.
Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, xi (2015).
KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, N. CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT, PREVENTABLE ERROR:
A REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 1997–2009, at 5 (2010); Sodersten, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 591–92.
10. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
11. Virginia Martucci, Chapter 467: Re-discovering Brady, Shifting the Balance of Power in
Criminal Discovery, 47 U. PAC. L. REV. 462, 466 (2016).
12. United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).
13. Margaret Z. Johns, Unsupportable and Unjustified: A Critique of Absolute Prosecutorial
Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 509, 510 (2011).
14. See id. at 513–14.
15. Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession’s Failure to Discipline Unethical Prosecutors, 36
HOFSTRA L. REV. 275, 276 (2007).
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prosecutorial misconduct.16 Since prosecutors hold absolute immunity
from civil liability, they are empowered to act with impunity because
there is no threat of monetary consequences.17 Additionally, prosecutors
rarely face professional discipline, so there are no career consequences
in the vast majority of cases.18 In California, judges have consistently
failed to report prosecutors to the state bar and, in the event they are
reported, the state bar rarely disciplines them.19
In response to the growing number of Brady violations, California
recently enacted a new law that changes the status of an “intentional”
Brady violation from a misdemeanor to a felony, and imposes up to three
years of prison time for those found guilty.20 This Note discusses why
California’s new law still fails to address the systematic problem of Brady
violations. Part I discusses the legal history of the Brady decision and its
progeny, as well as the shortcomings of the Brady rule. Part II explores
the pervasiveness of Brady violations in California specifically. Part III
explains why current safeguards are insufficient to control the problem.
Part IV argues that California’s new law will have little to no effect in
reducing the number of Brady violations in California. Finally, Part V
proposes alternative reforms that would address the fundamental
problems that lead to Brady violations.
I. THE BRADY DECISION AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS
A. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The failure to turn over exculpatory evidence is one of the most
common types of prosecutorial misconduct.21 Examples of exculpatory
evidence include third-party confessions to the crime, renunciations by
the victim, eyewitness identifications of another person as the
perpetrator or descriptions that are inconsistent with the defendant’s
appearance, and forensic evidence that excludes the defendant as the
perpetrator or fails to link the defendant to the crime scene.22 The
prosecutor’s obligation to disclose this type of evidence is a constitutional
requirement that was first set out in Brady v. Maryland.23
16. Id. at 276–77; Hadar Aviram, Legally Blind: Hyperadversarialism, Brady Violations, and
the Prosecutorial Organizational Culture, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 2 (2013).
17. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422 (1976).
18. See Kevin C. McMunigal, Prosecutorial Disclosure Violations: Punishment vs. Treatment, 64
MERCER L. REV. 711, 713 (2013).
19. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 3.
20. 2016 Cal. Stat. Ch. 879, Sec. 1 (A.B. 1909).
21. Davis, supra note 15, at 279.
22. Cynthia E. Jones, A Reason to Doubt: The Suppression of Evidence and the Inference of
Innocence, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 424 (2010) [hereinafter Jones, A Reason to Doubt].
23. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
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In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that a prosecutor’s
failure to disclose such evidence is a violation of the defendant’s due
process rights.24 Specifically, the Brady rule requires prosecutors to
disclose evidence materially favorable to the accused that, if suppressed,
would deprive the defendant of a fair trial.25 “Evidence is ‘favorable’ if it
either helps the defendant or hurts the prosecution . . . .”26 The evidence
is material if “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.”27 Importantly, the rule applies regardless of whether the
prosecutor was acting in good or bad faith.28
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court further expanded the
prosecutor’s discovery obligations under Brady. The rule now requires
that exculpatory evidence be turned over even in the absence of a request
from the defense.29 Exculpatory evidence also includes impeachment
evidence.30 Impeachment evidence consists of information that “casts
doubt on the ability of the witness to accurately perceive, recall, or report
the facts related to the witness’s testimony, including mental instability,
substance abuse, memory loss, or any other physical or mental
impairment.”31 Additionally, it includes information regarding incentives
that are given to witnesses to encourage or coerce them to testify on
behalf of the prosecution.32
The Court has also determined that even if the prosecutor is
personally unaware of the evidence, the state is not relieved from its
discovery obligations.33 “[T]he individual prosecutor has a duty to learn
of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s
behalf in the case, including the police.”34 In sum, there are three
components to a Brady violation: (1) the evidence is favorable to
exculpation or impeachment; (2) the evidence is either willfully or
inadvertently withheld by the prosecution; and (3) the withholding of the
evidence is prejudicial to the defendant.35

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985).
In re Sassounian, 887 P.2d 527, 532 (Cal. 1995).
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433–34 (1995).
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676.
Jones, A Reason to Doubt, supra note 22, at 426.
Jones, A Reason to Doubt, supra note 22, at 426.
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437.
Id.
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999).
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B. THE “MATERIALITY” REQUIREMENT
Despite its seemingly expansive protection, Brady has failed to have
a meaningful impact on a defendant’s right to a fair trial. This is in large
part due to the stringent materiality standard that was defined in the
cases following Brady. In Kyles v. Whitley, the Court provided further
clarity in regard to the standard:
The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have
received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he
received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of
confidence. A “reasonable probability” of a different result is accordingly
shown when the government’s evidentiary suppression “undermines
confidence in the outcome of the trial.”36

The defendant bears the heavy burden of proving that the evidence was
material.37
The materiality requirement to establish a Brady violation is a
demanding and difficult standard for a defendant to meet.38 Its narrow
definition only requires the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence
that, “if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial.”39
Moreover, it gives the court discretion as to whether a new trial should
be granted.40 This requires the judge to make a speculative determination
about whether or not the evidence would have affected the outcome of
the trial in hindsight, looking back on a trial that has ended with a
determination of guilt.41
Using this type of retrospective analysis is not ideal. It can cause
reasonable minds to differ, and the decision is rarely favorable to the
defendant. Strickler v. Greene provides a salient example.42 There, the
defendant was charged with capital murder and was convicted and
sentenced to death.43 Anne Stoltzfus, the prosecution’s key eyewitness to
the actual crime, testified that she saw the defendant and his accomplice
abduct the victim in a mall parking lot.44 However, it was later discovered
during the defendant’s habeas corpus proceedings that the prosecutor
did not turn over exculpatory evidence contained in the police file.45 The
36. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985)).
37. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
38. Lisa M. Kurcias, Note, Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 69 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1205, 1214 (2000).
39. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675.
40. See Brian Gregory, Note, Brady Is the Problem: Wrongful Convictions and the Case for “Open
File” Criminal Discovery, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 819, 825 (2012) (noting that the materiality of Brady
violations is discretionary).
41. Id.
42. 527 U.S. 263 (1999).
43. Id. at 266.
44. Id. at 270.
45. Id. at 266.
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evidence consisted of letters written by Stoltzfus to the detective
investigating the case and notes taken during an interview with
Stoltzfus.46 Specifically, the documents revealed that Stoltzfus did not
initially remember being at the mall and had only a vague recollection of
the abduction, contradictory to her trial testimony.47 Additionally, the
detective’s notes revealed that Stoltzfus could not initially identify the
defendant in a photo lineup.48 This evidence cast serious doubt on
Stoltzfus’ testimony.49
Despite the importance of this evidence, the Supreme Court held
that the defendant received a fair trial even in the absence of the
exculpatory evidence because there was not a “reasonable probability
that his conviction or sentence would have been different had the
suppressed documents been disclosed.”50 The Court reasoned that even
if the defense could have impeached Stoltzfus’ testimony, two other
eyewitnesses placed the defendant at the mall on the day of the murder.51
However, this fails to take into account the fact that Stoltzfus was
the only witness who testified that the defendant was the aggressor and
initiated the abduction.52 While the dissenting opinion stressed that this
testimony could have influenced the jury’s decision on whether or not to
impose the death penalty, the majority disagreed.53 There was also
disagreement at the lower court level, and the majority acknowledged
that “[t]he differing judgments of the District Court and the Court of
Appeals attest to the difficulty of resolving the issue of prejudice.”54 This
demonstrates that even devastating impeachment evidence may not rise
to the level of materiality required for a Brady violation, and courts are
often deferential to the prosecution in “close calls.”
In cases such as Strickler, where the judge determines that the
exculpatory evidence is immaterial, the conviction stands, and the judge
is not required to report the prosecutor to the state bar.55 California only
requires judges to report misconduct when it results in reversal or
modification of the judgment.56 This means that a prosecutor can
intentionally withhold exculpatory evidence and nonetheless escape any

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 273.
Id. at 273.
Id. at 264.
Id. at 293–94.
Id. at 304 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 302 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 289.
Johns, supra note 13, at 517.
Johns, supra note 13, at 517.
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consequence if the court finds that the evidence was immaterial.57
Furthermore, a judge’s conclusion that the evidence was immaterial is
not equivalent to a trivial mistake on the part of the prosecutor since the
egregiousness of the nondisclosure is not relevant to the determination
of materiality.58 Thus, prosecutors know that even if their misconduct is
discovered, the consequence of a conviction reversal is rare because the
materiality requirement is such a high bar for the defendant to meet.59
This enables prosecutors to essentially “play the odds.”60
C. BRADY IN THE CONTEXT OF PLEA BARGAINS
In practice, the Brady rule has no effect on the majority of criminal
cases.61 In United States v. Ruiz, the Court held that the Constitution
does not require the prosecution to disclose material impeachment
evidence prior to a plea agreement.62 Prior to the Court’s ruling in Ruiz,
the Ninth Circuit had adopted a per se rule where a Brady violation
automatically rendered a plea invalid because it precluded the plea from
being “knowing and voluntary,” two requirements of a valid plea
bargain.63 However, in Ruiz, the Supreme Court ultimately disagreed
with the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that a guilty plea is not voluntary
unless it is made after the full disclosure of material impeachment
evidence.64 Whether this holding applies to all exculpatory evidence is
technically still an undecided question, but it almost certainly does since
the Court previously held that “there is ‘no such distinction between
impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence [for the purposes of
Brady].’”65
Because the Brady rule does not apply to any case resolved through
a plea bargain, if defense attorneys do not discover the exculpatory
information through their own investigation, their “advice to [their]
client[s] about whether to take the plea will not be fully informed.”66
Many commentators have argued that the decision to plead guilty is not
necessarily based on whether the defendant is innocent, but instead on

57. Kurcias, supra note 38, at 1215.
58. Johns, supra note 13, at 517.
59. Davis, supra note 15, at 280–81.
60. Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 690 (2006).
61. Gregory, supra note 40, at 827.
62. 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002).
63. Michael Nasser Petegorsky, Note, Plea Bargaining in the Dark: The Duty to Disclose
Exculpatory Brady Evidence During Plea Bargaining, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3599, 3621 (2013)
(discussing the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1995)).
64. Id. at 3623.
65. Gregory, supra note 40, at 825 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985)).
66. Davis, supra note 15, at 286.
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the defense’s assessment of the strength of the prosecutor’s case.67
Additionally, prosecutors will add on as many charges as possible so as
to make it too risky for a defendant to go to trial, even if he or she is
innocent.68 This is significant because ninety-seven percent of felony
cases resolve without trial, and the majority through plea bargains, where
there is a notable lack of judicial scrutiny.69 Therefore, prosecutors are
not required to disclose exculpatory evidence in the vast majority of
criminal cases, further limiting the practical reach of Brady.70
D. BRADY’S REMEDY
Even when a Brady violation is discovered, the only remedy for the
defendant is a new trial.71 Brady does not require that prosecutors be
sanctioned for violating their discovery obligations; it only acknowledges
that a defendant’s due process rights have been violated, which can be
grounds for a new trial.72 Thus, unless states enforce their ethical rules,
prosecutors are left in no worse position than had they originally
disclosed the evidence. Consequently, without adequate enforcement,
there is no meaningful incentive for prosecutors to err on the side of
disclosure.
II. BRADY VIOLATIONS ARE A SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM IN CALIFORNIA
In Brady, the Court declared that “[s]ociety wins not only when the
guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair.”73 However, as
Brady essentially imposes an affirmative duty on the prosecution to help
the defense make its case, it has not always been followed.74 In fact,
empirical research demonstrates that Brady violations have become the
norm rather than the exception.75 Former Judge Alex Kozinski of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that “Brady violations have

67. Petegorsky, supra note 63, at 3612.
68. Kozinski, supra note 8, at xxii.
69. Johns, supra note 13, at 513, 517.
70. Gregory, supra note 40, at 827.
71. See generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
72. Id. at 87. But see CAL. R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT 5-110(D) (Nov. 2, 2017) (“The prosecutor in a
criminal case shall [m]ake timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the
prosecutor that the prosecutor knows or reasonably should know tends to negate the guilt of the
accused . . . .”).
73. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
74. Aviram, supra note 16, at 17.
75. Bennett L. Gershman, Bad Faith Exception to Prosecutorial Immunity for Brady Violations,
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 31 (Aug. 10, 2010), http://harvardcrcl.org/bad-faith-exception-toprosecutorial-immunity-for-brady-violations-by-bennett-gershman [hereinafter Gershman, Bad
Faith Exception].
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reached epidemic proportions in recent years,” and that “prosecutors
don’t care about Brady because courts don’t make them care.”76
A. NORTHERN CALIFORNIA INNOCENCE PROJECT STUDY
In 2010, the Northern California Innocence Project conducted a
statewide study on prosecutorial misconduct.77 The study reviewed over
4,000 California state and federal appellate decisions from 1997 to 2009
in which there was an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct.78 The
courts found prosecutorial misconduct in 707 cases.79 Brady violations
were responsible for 66 of the 707 misconduct findings and were
identified as one of the most pervasive forms of prosecutorial misconduct
in the study.80
The Innocence Project’s study provides a good frame of reference for
the significance of the problem, but as acknowledged by the study, its
findings probably grossly underestimate the actual number of cases
involving Brady violations.81 Prosecutorial misconduct is often difficult
to uncover, which is especially true in the case of Brady violations.82 By
their very nature, Brady violations are difficult to uncover because “they
involve evidence that is hidden from the defense.”83 Consequently, it is
very difficult for the defense to find out if the prosecutor is complying
with his or her disclosure obligations.84 Furthermore, the extensive reinvestigation effort that is necessary to uncover a post-conviction Brady
violation is rarely conducted.85 This is likely why most Brady violations
are discovered by pure accident.86 Thus, because the majority of
violations are never discovered, the problem is more widespread than the
number of reported violations indicate.87 Indeed, many scholars have
argued that the disclosure violations that have come to light are only the
tip of the iceberg.88

76. United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).
77. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 2.
78. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 2.
79. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 2.
80. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 25, 36.
81. Johns, supra note 13, at 513.
82. Johns, supra note 13, at 513, 521.
83. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 37.
84. Kozinski, supra note 8, at xxii.
85. Sara Gurwitch, When Self-Policing Does Not Work: A Proposal for Policing Prosecutors in
Their Obligation to Provide Exculpatory Evidence to the Defense, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 303, 306–
07 (2010).
86. Jones, A Reason to Doubt, supra note 22, at 433.
87. Davis, supra note 15, at 278.
88. See McMunigal, supra note 18, at 721.
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B. ORANGE COUNTY SCANDAL
A recent scandal in Orange County provides further evidence of the
pervasiveness of the problem in California. In 2011, Orange County
attracted national attention for allegations of prosecutorial misconduct
in a high-profile murder case.89 Due to a child custody dispute, Scott
Dekraai killed eight people in Seal Beach, including his ex-wife.90 It was
the worst mass shooting in Orange County’s history.91
In March 2015, Orange County Superior Court Judge Thomas
Goethals felt compelled to remove the entire Orange County District
Attorney’s 250-lawyer office from the case after evidence was discovered
that the office had systematically hidden evidence and colluded with
jailhouse informants for false testimony.92 The evidence revealed that
jailers in the county had moved a jailhouse informant next to Dekraai’s
cell to get him to incriminate himself, a violation of Dekraai’s
constitutional rights.93 Dekraai’s attorney, Scott Sanders, alleged that the
prosecutors knew about this practice but failed to turn over the
information to the defense in violation of Brady.94
After this revelation, it came out that the misconduct had been
occurring for decades.95 A secret database that was used by the Orange
County District Attorney’s office for over twenty-five years contained
exculpatory data that was never produced despite numerous discovery
orders.96 Thus, prosecutors who knew about the database had violated
Brady potentially hundreds or even thousands of times.97 As this practice
had been going on for years, it potentially tainted numerous
convictions.98
The Orange County scandal presents an example of how Brady
violations can be pervasive and concealed for decades before being

89. Matt Ferner, Cheating California Prosecutors Face Prison Under New Law, HUFFINGTON
POST (Oct. 1, 2016, 7:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/california-prosecutormisconduct felony_us_57eff9b7e4b024a52d2f4d65.
90. Lorelei Laird, Secret Snitches: California Case Uncovers Long-Standing Practice of Planting
Jailhouse Informants, A.B.A. J., May 2016, at 46, 48 [hereinafter Laird, Secret Snitches].
91. Id. at 46.
92. Id.; Christopher Goffard, Prosecutors Who Withhold or Tamper with Evidence Now Face
Felony Charges, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2016, 7:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-meprosecutor-misconduct-20161003-snap-story.html; Martucci, supra note 11, at 470–71.
93. Lorelei Laird, California Makes It a Felony for Prosecutors to Withhold or Alter Exculpatory
Evidence,
A.B.A.
J.,
(Oct.
5,
2016,
3:00
PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/
news/article/california_makes_it_a_felony_for_prosecutors_to_withhold_or_alter_exculpato
[hereinafter Laird, California Makes it a Felony].
94. Id.
95. Martucci, supra note 11, at 472–73.
96. Martucci, supra note 11, at 472–73.
97. Laird, Secret Snitches, supra note 90, at 46.
98. Laird, California Makes It a Felony, supra note 93.
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discovered.99 And yet, even with the national attention that the scandal
drew, there have been very few consequences for the accused prosecutors
in the Orange County District Attorney’s office.100
III. CURRENT SAFEGUARDS ARE INSUFFICIENT
There is a general lack of accountability for prosecutors in the
criminal justice system.101 Even though prosecutors have a constitutional
obligation to turn over exculpatory evidence, there are virtually no
consequences if they do not.102 In 1976, the Supreme Court ruled that
prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil liability.103 Thus,
prosecutors do not fear the threat of monetary consequences when they
make decisions regarding whether or not to comply with their obligation
to disclose exculpatory evidence.104 Additionally, there are only weak
professional constraints on prosecutors, and prosecutors are rarely
disciplined when they violate their disclosure obligations under Brady.105
Prosecutors often go unpunished because judges fail to report the
misconduct or the California State Bar opts not to impose disciplinary
sanctions.106 Moreover, prosecutors are easily able to evade the rule since
most Brady violations are never discovered in the first place.107 This lack
of accountability has allowed prosecutors to act with virtual impunity.108
A. PROSECUTORS HAVE ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY FROM CIVIL LIABILITY
In Imbler v. Pachtman, the Supreme Court substantially narrowed
one of the few remaining avenues for deterring prosecutorial misconduct
by holding that prosecutors cannot be held civilly liable under a § 1983
lawsuit.109 The Court reached this decision despite the fact that executive
branch officials only receive qualified immunity under common law.110
The Court reasoned that affording prosecutors only qualified immunity
would have an adverse effect on the criminal justice system because

99. Martucci, supra note 11, at 472–73.
100. Laird, California Makes It a Felony, supra note 93.
101. Randall Grometstein & Jennifer M. Balboni, Backing Out of a Constitutional Ditch:
Constitutional Remedies for Gross Prosecutorial Misconduct Post Thompson, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1243,
1268 (2012).
102. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 76.
103. McMunigal, supra note 18, at 713.
104. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 76.
105. Grometstein & Balboni, supra note 101, at 1268; McMunigal, supra note 18, at 713.
106. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 3.
107. Gershman, Bad Faith Exception, supra note 75, at 4; McMunigal, supra note 18, at 713.
108. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 60.
109. 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)).
110. Gershman, Bad Faith Exception, supra note 75, at 20.
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prosecutors would have greater difficulty in meeting the standard than
other executive branch officials such as governors and police officers.111
Imbler’s holding applies to all instances of prosecutorial
misconduct, regardless of bad faith or malicious conduct.112 Thus,
prosecutors are immune from any real consequences regardless of
whether their acts are intentional.113 The Court decided that it is “better
to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to
subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of
retaliation.”114 Imbler created a broad rule of absolute immunity for
prosecutors that applies when they are operating in their role as an
advocate.115 The Court’s decision effectively altered the balance of power
in the criminal justice system more heavily in favor of the prosecutor.116
Recently, in 2011, the Court decided whether a prosecutorial agency
or municipality could be held civilly liable for a Brady violation under a
§ 1983 lawsuit.117 The Court determined that, for a plaintiff to prevail, the
plaintiff must show “a pattern of similar constitutional violations,” which
could establish “deliberate indifference” on the part of the prosecutorial
agency in failing to train its attorneys regarding compliance with
Brady.118 However, deliberate indifference is an extremely difficult
standard to meet, and it is unlikely that a plaintiff will ever be able to
succeed in holding a prosecutorial agency liable for civil damages under
the standard.119
In allowing prosecutors to have absolute immunity from civil
liability, the Supreme Court justified its conclusion by stating that there
were other remedial mechanisms by which prosecutors would be held
accountable, namely criminal sanctions and professional discipline.120
Despite the Court’s confidence in these existing legal remedies, they have
proven wholly ineffective in deterring Brady violations.121 The Court in
Imbler failed to take into account the special nature of the Brady rule
and the ease with which prosecutors can escape consequences.122

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
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Gershman, Bad Faith Exception, supra note 75, at 21.
Johns, supra note 13, at 521.
RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 75.
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 428 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)).
Gershman, Bad Faith Exception, supra note 75, at 28.
Gershman, Bad Faith Exception, supra note 75, at 3.
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 72 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 52.
Gregory, supra note 40, at 832.
Grometstein, supra note 101, at 1249; Johns, supra note 13, at 516.
Johns, supra note 13, at 521.
Gershman, Bad Faith Exception, supra note 75, at 28.
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B. THERE IS A LACK OF DISCIPLINE FOR PROSECUTORS THAT VIOLATE
BRADY
The Supreme Court’s assumption that prosecutors would be
deterred by the threat of disciplinary sanctions has proven to be entirely
inaccurate.123 Consequently, Brady has failed to produce a meaningful
change in the criminal justice system, and instead, has become an
illusory protection because it lacks enforcement and consequences.124
Even in cases where a Brady violation occurs, the appropriate
disciplinary bodies rarely take action.125
Judges routinely ignore their duty to report violators to the state bar
despite their statutory obligation to do so imposed by section 6086.7 of
the California Business and Professions Code.126 The reporting statute
does not afford judges the discretion to decide whether to report
misconduct, even non-egregious conduct.127 The statute recognizes that
any conduct that results in a reversal is serious enough to require
notification of the state bar.128 Yet, there is little evidence to suggest that
judges are meeting their reporting obligations under California law.129 As
former Judge Alex Kozinski put it, prosecutors will continue to engage in
misconduct because there are “state judges who are willing to look the
other way.”130 In part, this may be due to a judicial bias in favor of
prosecutors as many judges were appointed during tough-on-crime
eras.131 Moreover, many judges were former prosecutors,132 which may
add to their bias.
The California State Bar has also been reluctant to discipline the
prosecutors who are reported.133 The State Bar has consistently failed to
discipline prosecutors even in the most obvious and easily provable cases
of disclosure violations where the court was explicitly clear that a
violation had occurred.134 The Innocence Project study concluded that
only ten prosecutors were disciplined over the nearly thirteen-year
123. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 71.
124. See Gershman, Bad Faith Exception, supra note 75, at 6.
125. Johns, supra note 13, at 518–19.
126. Johns, supra note 13, at 518–19.
127. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 49.
128. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 49.
129. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 48.
130. Maura Dolan, U.S. Judges See ‘Epidemic’ of Prosecutorial Misconduct in State, L.A. TIMES
(Jan. 31, 2015, 7:20 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/politics/la-me-lying-prosecutors-20150201story.html.
131. Martucci, supra note 11, at 473.
132. ALL. FOR JUSTICE, BROADENING THE BENCH: PROFESSIONAL DIVERSITY AND JUDICIAL
NOMINATIONS 8 (2016), http://www.afj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Professional-DiversityReport.pdf.
133. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 3.
134. Gershman, Bad Faith Exception, supra note 75, at 34.
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period from 1997 to 2009.135 The study also found that many of the
undisciplined prosecutors had engaged in misconduct more than once.136
However, this is not due to a general reluctance by the California State
Bar to discipline attorneys. As reported in the California State Bar
Journal, California attorneys were publicly disciplined 4,741 times but
only ten disciplinary reports involved prosecutors, and only six involved
the handling of a criminal case.137 Of the six prosecutors that were
disciplined in the handling of a criminal case, three were suspended from
the practice of law, while two were publicly reprimanded and one was
placed on probation.138 Not a single prosecutor has been disbarred in
California for prosecutorial misconduct.139
The lack of discipline for Brady violations is not even unique to
California. In 2003, the Center for Public Integrity conducted one of the
most comprehensive studies of prosecutorial misconduct across the
nation and concluded that only two percent of cases in the past fifty years
resulted in public sanctions.140 Brady violations were responsible for a
large majority of the misconduct that resulted in reversed convictions.141
IV. CALIFORNIA’S NEW LAW WILL FAIL TO REMEDY BRADY VIOLATIONS
In response to the growing number of Brady violations, California
recently passed a new law that raises the charge from a misdemeanor to
a felony for intentionally withholding exculpatory evidence.142 The law
amended section 141 of the Penal Code and reads as follows:
(c) A prosecuting attorney who intentionally and in bad faith alters,
modifies, or withholds any physical matter, digital image, video recording,
or relevant exculpatory material or information, knowing that it is relevant
and material to the outcome of the case, with the specific intent that the
physical matter, digital image, video recording, or relevant exculpatory
material or information will be concealed or destroyed, or fraudulently
represented as the original evidence upon a trial, proceeding, or inquiry, is
guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h)
of Section 1170 for 16 months, or two or three years.143

Depending on the severity of the violation, a prosecutor now faces up to
three years in prison.144 However, by increasing the penalty, the law only
reinforces what prosecutors already have a constitutional obligation to
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 3.
RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 57.
RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 54.
RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 55.
RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 56.
Davis, supra note 15, at 278, 292.
Gershman, Bad Faith Exception, supra note 75, at 13.
Goffard, supra note 92.
2016 Cal. Stat. Ch. 879, Sec. 1 (AB 1909).
Goffard, supra note 92; Ferner, supra note 89.
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donot violate Brady. This section addresses why the new law will be
deficient in rectifying the Brady problem in California.
A. THE LAW WILL FAIL TO DETER EVEN THE MOST EGREGIOUS BRADY
VIOLATIONS
The possibility of criminal sanctions was one of the remedies that
the Supreme Court identified as a deterrent for prosecutorial misconduct
in lieu of civil liability.145 However, criminal prosecutions for
prosecutorial misconduct are extremely rare.146 There has not been a
single criminal prosecution of a prosecutor in California since Imbler was
decided forty years ago.147 Indeed, former Judge Alex Kozinski wrote that
the Supreme Court’s suggestion that prosecutors would be held
accountable through criminal prosecution “was dubious in 1976 and is
absurd today.”148 It is very unlikely that prosecutors will prosecute one of
their own.149 Moreover, the fact that the law in California previously
imposed a misdemeanor, and failed to redress the problem, shows that
the threat of criminal sanctions is not an effective deterrent.
Even nationwide, there have been very few criminal charges against
prosecutors for deliberate Brady violations.150 Although prosecutors can
be criminally prosecuted for violating constitutional protections under 18
U.S.C. § 242, only one prosecutor has ever been convicted under the
statute.151 Additionally, with the exception of a couple of very high-profile
cases, state penal code laws that require criminal penalties for
prosecutors that violate Brady are so infrequently enforced that the
possibility of prosecution is almost nonexistent.152
The prosecution of Ken Anderson is one of the exceedingly rare
examples of a prosecutor facing jail time for withholding evidence. In
1987, Anderson prosecuted Michael Morton for the murder of Morton’s
wife.153 Anderson violated Brady when he intentionally did not inform
the defense of a blood-stained bandana that was discovered near
Morton’s house.154 The jury convicted Morton in the absence of this
crucial evidence supporting Morton’s innocence.155 The evidence was
eventually tested for DNA, which not only exonerated Morton, but
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Johns, supra note 13, at 520.
Johns, supra note 13, at 521.
Gershman, Bad Faith Exception, supra note 75, at 33.
Kozinski, supra note 8, at xxxix.
Kozinski, supra note 8, at xxxix.
Gershman, Bad Faith Exception, supra note 75, at 33.
Johns, supra note 13, at 520.
Gurwitch, supra note 85, at 318–19.
Joe Nocera, Opinion, A Texas Prosecutor Faces Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2012, at A27.
Id.
Id.
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pointed to another man.156 Despite Anderson’s blatant concealment of
critical evidence, he only received a ten-day jail sentence.157 However,
even though the jail sentence was “insultingly short” in comparison to the
twenty-five years that Michael Morton spent behind bars, because
“prosecutors are so rarely held accountable for their misconduct, the
sentence [was] remarkable nonetheless.”158
The other rare instance of a prosecutor receiving jail time for
withholding exculpatory evidence is that of Mike Nifong. Nifong was the
prosecutor in a high-profile case involving members of the Duke
University lacrosse team.159 Nifong was prosecuted for withholding
exculpatory DNA test results.160 Similar to Ken Anderson, Nifong only
received nominal criminal punishment: one day in jail.161 Both these
cases are unusual in that they garnered national publicity, which likely
motivated the imposition of punishment.162
It is noteworthy that none of the prosecutors in the Orange County
scandal have faced any consequences for their involvement in the blatant
cover-up of decades-long Brady violations.163 This is ironic because the
Orange County scandal played a large role in prompting the proposal for
the new law.164 The California Attorney General’s office has consistently
argued that the Orange County Sheriff’s Department was solely
responsible for the misconduct.165 However, according to Laura
Fernandez of Yale Law School, who studies prosecutorial misconduct, the
Orange County scandal was a “massive cover-up by both law enforcement
and prosecutorsa cover-up that appears to have risen to the level of
perjury and obstruction of justice.”166 The scandal affected at least three
dozen cases, but not a single prosecutor has faced any consequences, let
alone criminal consequences.167
The effectiveness of the new law as a deterrent depends on courts’
ability to identify prosecutorial misconduct and the willingness of the
156. Id.
157. Editorial, A Prosecutor Is Punished, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2013, at A20.
158. Id.
159. Gurwitch, supra note 85, at 318–19.
160. Gurwitch, supra note 85, at 318–19.
161. Jaime Gordon, Prosecutor in Duke Lacrosse Case Mike Nifong Faces More Misconduct
Allegations, DUKE CHRON. (July 7, 2016), http://www.dukechronicle.com/article/2016/07/
prosecutor-in-duke-lacrosse-case-mike-nifong-faces-more-misconduct-allegations.
162. Gurwitch, supra note 85, at 319.
163. Laird, Secret Snitches, supra note 90, at 48.
164. Goffard, supra note 92.
165. Laird, Secret Snitches, supra note 90, at 48.
166. Radley Balko, The Jaw-Dropping Police/Prosecutor Scandal in Orange County, Calif.,
WASH. POST (July 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/07/13/
the-jaw-dropping-policeprosecutor-scandal-in-orange-county-calif/.
167. Id.; Laird, Secret Snitches, supra note 90, at 48.
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California Attorney General’s office to actually prosecute those that are
identified. As discussed above, it is unlikely that either of those things
will happen. Thus, the issue is not that penalties for Brady violations are
too lenient, but rather that penalties are not even being imposed in the
first place. The fact that the new law imposes a harsher penalty is
irrelevant if the law is not being enforced. Therefore, the law will likely
fail to deter even the most egregious Brady violations.
B. THE LAW WILL HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE MAJORITY OF BRADY
VIOLATIONS
Intentional Brady violations “occur when the prosecutor fully
understands the Brady disclosure duty, is aware of the existence of
favorable evidence in the government’s possession, appreciates the
exculpatory or impeachment value of the evidence, but intentionally
withholds the evidence to gain a tactical advantage in the litigation.”168
While some Brady violations are in fact intentional and potentially
malicious, the majority of violations occur due to the conviction-oriented
behavior inherent in the prosecutorial role.169 In fact, of the twenty-nine
cases that former Judge Alex Kozinski noted in his dissenting opinion in
United States v. Olsen, less than half of them involved intentional
violations.170
Research indicates that the organizational culture of prosecutor
offices is responsible for far more instances of Brady violations than
malicious conduct on the part of individual prosecutors.171 There are a
variety of psychological factors that can cause even well-motivated
prosecutors to commit disclosure violations.172 Specifically,
psychological errors such as confirmation bias and tunnel vision likely
play a large role in the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.173 Tunnel
vision and confirmation bias can subconsciously cause a prosecutor to
only look for evidence that establishes a defendant’s guilt, and in turn,
ignore any evidence that is contradictory.174 Tunnel vision can cause
prosecutors to ignore, overlook or dismiss evidence as being irrelevant or
unreliable.175 Confirmation bias can cause prosecutors to discount
evidence that is contrary to their theory of guilt.176
168. Jones, A Reason to Doubt, supra note 22, at 428.
169. Aviram, supra note 16, at 4.
170. Jerry P. Coleman & Jordan Lockey, Brady “Epidemic” Misdiagnosis: Claims of Prosecutorial
Misconduct and the Sanctions to Deter It, 50 U.S.F. L. REV. 199, 226 (2016).
171. Aviram, supra note 16, at 42.
172. McMunigal, supra note 18, at 716.
173. Id. at 712; Aviram, supra note 16, at 5.
174. McMunigal, supra note 18, at 716.
175. Gershman, Bad Faith Exception, supra note 75, at 9.
176. Gershman, Bad Faith Exception, supra note 75, at 9.
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These psychological factors can cause prosecutors to overestimate
the strength of their case and underestimate the evidence that
undermines their case.177 Additionally, prosecutors are also not good
predictors of what evidence will be important to the defense’s case
because they are not trained to think like defense lawyers.178 Moreover,
they are not privy to the defense’s strategy, and are thus bound to make
incorrect assumptions about what evidence is material.179 They may even
discount exculpatory evidence that is potentially material because they
can foresee how it might later be rebutted during trial.180 As such,
prosecutors are not in the position to properly guess what evidence might
be helpful to the defense.181 Accordingly, a prosecutor may reasonably
view contradictory evidence as not rising to the high level of materiality
required for disclosure under Brady.182
A prosecutor’s conflicting role as advocate and minister of justice
can also lead to the temptation to withhold exculpatory evidence.183 The
American criminal justice system was designed as an adversarial system,
but Brady requires prosecutors to depart from their adversarial role.184
Many studies have recognized that prosecutors are predisposed to ignore
Brady because the obligations imposed by the rule are counterintuitive
to the psychology of a prosecutor in his or her role as an advocate.185
Brady expects prosecutors to have the capacity to set aside their personal
biases and competitive inclinations in the search for truth that the justice
system requires of them.186
Imposing criminal sanctions for intentional Brady violations is a
futile approach if the majority of violations stem from unintentional
behavior. Additionally, criminal sanctions only focus on the individual
prosecutor rather than prosecutor offices as a whole where the culture
likely plays a large role.187 As California’s new law impacts only individual
prosecutors acting in bad faith, it fails to address the fundamental
problemthe culture of prosecutor offices that leads to confirmation

177. Gershman, Bad Faith Exception, supra note 75, at 9–10.
178. Laurie L. Levenson, Discovery from the Trenches: The Future of Brady, 60 UCLA L. REV.
DISCOURSE 74, 80 (2013) [hereinafter Levenson, Discovery from the Trenches].
179. Id.
180. See id. at 88 (discussing the current adversarial system that incentivizes guarding evidence).
181. Id.
182. Gershman, Bad Faith Exception, supra note 75, at 8.
183. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 44.
184. Levenson, Discovery from the Trenches, supra note 178, at 76, 81.
185. Gershman, Bad Faith Exception, supra note 75, at 7–8.
186. Gershman, Bad Faith Exception, supra note 75, at 7.
187. McMunigal, supra note 18, at 715.
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bias, tunnel vision and a strong incentive to secure convictions rather
than seek justice.188
V. PROPOSED REFORMS
In addition to a lack of deterrent value, criminal sanctions are
antithetical to the overall problem they seek to address. If the goal of
criminal justice reform is to reduce criminalization, then further
criminalization is not the desirable consequence. Rather, consequences
should involve professional discipline, including sanctions, suspension,
and disbarment. Additionally, increasing the severity of sanctions may
create a disincentive for prosecutor offices to be transparent and
cooperative.189 It may also discourage prosecutors from participating in
reform.190 This section proposes alternative reforms that seek to avoid
these drawbacks.
The first step in addressing the problem is to implement changes to
make it more likely that prosecutors will be sanctioned for egregious
violations in order to “make the risk of non-compliance too costly.”191 “A
robust and rigorously enforced Brady rule is imperative because all the
incentives prosecutors confront encourage them not to discover or
disclose exculpatory evidence.”192 To ensure that prosecutors face
consequences for violating Brady, California should implement the
proposals laid out in the Northern California Innocence Project’s
study.193
The Innocence Project’s study recommends a number of reforms.194
One such reform is expanding section 6086.7 of the California Business
and Professions Code to require judges to name prosecutors in opinions
finding misconduct.195 The California Supreme Court would be
responsible for actively monitoring compliance with the statute.196 This
would provide more transparency and would notify prosecutors of their
misconduct.197 It would also have the important benefit of creating a
188. Aviram, supra note 16, at 5.
189. McMunigal, supra note 18, at 711 (arguing that increased sanctions will likely discourage
prosecutors from creating and sharing information about when and why Brady violations
occurinformation that is necessary to deter future violations).
190. McMunigal, supra note 18, at 718 (“[B]lam[ing] prosecutors for Brady violations is
counterproductive . . . because it alienates prosecutors and discourages prosecutorial participation in
reform.”).
191. Gershman, Bad Faith Exception, supra note 75, at 36 (quoting United States v. Shaygan, 661
F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2009)).
192. United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).
193. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 78–82.
194. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 78–82.
195. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 80.
196. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 80.
197. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 80.
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deterrent since prosecutors would not want to be publicly named for
misconduct.198 Otherwise, it is too easy for prosecutors to hide from
public scrutiny when only the judge and a few lawyers know about their
misconduct.199
Currently, very few appellate courts name prosecutors in their
opinions, which allows prosecutors to operate with little risk of public
embarrassment or reproval.200 This is not the same for defense attorneys,
who regularly find their names written in judicial opinions regarding
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.201 For some reason, judges
seem reluctant to apply this same treatment when prosecutors are
involved.202 In fact, only eighty prosecutors were named out of the 707
cases identified in the study where courts found misconduct.203 To
identify the other prosecutors, the authors of the study had to conduct a
difficult and time-consuming search of the trial records.204
The study also calls for more extensive training of prosecutors
regarding their ethical duties.205 Specifically, the California State Bar,
California District Attorneys Association, California Public Defenders
Association and California Attorneys for Criminal Justice should develop
a course to address ethical issues that arise in criminal cases.206 The study
recommends that attorneys be required to retake the course every three
years.207 Additionally, district attorney offices and law enforcement
agencies should adopt internal written policies regarding Brady
compliance.208 These policies would include “procedures for collecting
Brady material, tracking its delivery and disclosing it to the defense.”209
Rather than leaving it up to individual prosecutors, establishing policies
in prosecutor offices would ensure greater compliance.210
Most importantly, the study also calls for greater transparency from
the California State Bar.211 The current lack of transparency makes it

198. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 80.
199. Kozinski, supra note 8, at xxxvi.
200. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 50; Tracey Kaplan, California Bar Reviewing 130
Prosecutors for Possible Disciplinary Action, MERCURY NEWS (Oct. 17, 2010, 12:32 PM),
http://www.mercurynews.com/2010/10/17/california-bar-reviewing-130-prosecutors-for-possibledisciplinary-action.
201. Kozinski, supra note 8, at xxxv.
202. Kozinski, supra note 8, at xxxv.
203. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 50.
204. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 51.
205. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 78.
206. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 78.
207. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 78.
208. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 79.
209. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 79.
210. Kozinski, supra note 8, at xxviii.
211. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 82.
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difficult to assess whether the State Bar is actually holding prosecutors
accountable.212 In particular, the study proposes that the State Bar should
make public the reasons for closing an investigation where a court
reported misconduct.213 Additionally, in its annual discipline report, the
State Bar should specify the number of prosecutors that were
investigated and received discipline.214 However, in response to this
recommendation, the State Bar’s deputy trial counsel, Cydney Batchelor,
stated that the State Bar is bound by confidentiality rules and statutes,
and these changes would have to be implemented by an amendment to
the statute.215 Therefore, it is within the purview of the California
legislature to take action and address these issues of transparency.
CONCLUSION
The criminal justice system needs clear rules for prosecutors’
disclosure obligations and adequate disciplinary mechanisms to ensure
that prosecutors comply with the rules. Currently, California lacks both,
and the new law will fail to remedy these systemic flaws. The new law will
not serve as an effective deterrent because prosecutors are rarely
disciplined, and thus, the severity of the penalty is irrelevant.
Additionally, as California’s new law seeks to address only intentional
disclosure violations, it fails to have any impact on the majority of
violationsthose that occur when prosecutors negligently overlook or
fail to appreciate the probative value of the evidence. Although
California’s new law is a step in the right direction, it is a very small step
in addressing the broader problem of Brady violations. It remains to be
seen whether the law will have any effect at all in light of the above
discussion. Instead, it would be more prudent for California to
implement the proposals laid out in the Innocence Project study.

212. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 82.
213. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 82.
214. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 9, at 82.
215. Diane Curtis, Bar Responds to Innocence Project Report, CAL. B. J. (Nov. 2010),
http://www.calbarjournal.com/November2010/TopHeadlines/TH5.aspx.

